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Abstract
Human languages are transmitted by iterated learning: we learn the language
of our speech community by observing language use in communicative interaction,
and then in turn we produce linguistic behaviours which become the basis for learn-
ing in others. Computational and experimental models of iterated learning show
that linguistic structure (including compositional structure, which underpins the
open-ended expressivity of human language) evolves on a cultural timescale as a re-
sult of this iterated learning process. I consider the implications of this work for our
understanding of the cognitive capacities required to support linguistic structure,
highlighting the importance of the capacities to acquire compositionally-structured
meaning-signal mappings from data, and to reason about the minds of others during
learning and use.
Structure gives language open-ended expressive power
Uniquely among the communication systems of the natural world, human lan-
guage allows the open-ended transmission of information: any idea I am capable
of entertaining in my mind can be encoded in a linguistic signal and transmitted to
your mind, provided we share a common language. Language achieves this open-
ended expressivity by combining two features seen separately in other naturally-
occurring communication systems [1]. Firstly, language exhibits semanticity: we
use words and sentences to refer to objects or states of affairs in the world. Sec-
ond, language is combinatorial, at multiple levels — we combine and recombine
speech-sounds to form morphemes, and combine and recombine morphemes to
build complex words, phrases, and sentences (e.g. the sentence she jumped in-
cludes 7 phonemes [transcribed S, i, Ã, 2, m, p, t], 3 morphemes [she, jump, and
the past-tense morpheme -ed], and 2 words).
While these component features are seen elsewhere in the natural world (see
Figure 1), human language is unusual in exploiting the combinatorial structure of
signals to convey complex meanings. All human languages are pervasively compo-
sitional: the meaning of a complex signal is a function of the meaning of its parts
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and the way in which they are combined [2]. Compositionality allows us to con-
vey differences in meaning by choosing different morphemes to occupy a particular
structural position (e.g. she jumped means something different from he jumps by
virtue of the differences in meaning of the elements she and he, -ed and -s), or by
combining morphemes in different structural configurations (e.g. Sam annoyed Jess
means something different from Jess annoyed Sam, and the meaning of an ambigu-
ous sentence like she saw the man with the telescope depends on the structure one
assigns to it). All human languages provide a grammar, a system for combining
meaning-bearing units in a rule-governed way. Knowing the grammar of a lan-
guage allows you to encode your thoughts, and (together with the context in which
an utterance is produced) decode the encoded thoughts of others; in contrast, as
discussed in the caption of Figure 1, the meaning-bearing potential of combinato-
riality is hardly exploited in the communication systems of other animals.
Structure emerges from learning and use
How did our species end up with this unusual and perhaps unique system of
communication? Human languages are, like many other human behaviours, cul-
turally transmitted — we learn the language of our speech community by observing
language use in communicative interaction, and then in turn we produce linguistic
behaviours which become the basis for learning in others. Because they are trans-
mitted through this repeated cycle of learning and use, we should expect languages
to evolve to reflect pressures inherent in language learning and linguistic communi-
cation: linguistic variants which are easy to acquire and useful for communication
should appear and proliferate, while those that are hard to learn or which don’t
serve people’s recurring communicative needs will tend to be replaced by better
alternatives.
A growing body of modelling and experimental work demonstrates how this
cultural evolutionary perspective can explain fundamental structural properties of
natural language as a consequence of biases in learning and use. This work has
its roots in computational models of learning and use in simulated populations (cf.
the seminal works in refs [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]). More recently, experimental
iterated learning techniques have been developed to study the same processes in
the lab: human participants are trained on miniature languages, then reproduce
those languages in a recall task or use them to communicate with another partic-
ipant (see Figure 2), thereby produce the input for learning by subsequent indi-
viduals (see Figure 3). Passing languages along chains of transmission provides
a laboratory analogue for the transmission of real languages in the wild, and al-
lows us to identify the conditions under which language-relevant features develop.
These experimental techniques have been applied to study the emergence of sym-
bols [21, 22, 23], combinatoriality [24, 25, 26], and compositionality [27, 28, 29].
Here, I focus on work on the evolution of compositional structure, which suggests
that compositionality structure emerges when pressures from learning and use are
both at play, but not when these pressures operate in isolation.
Languages which are passed from person to person via learning and recall (where
the aim of the participant is simply to reproduce the language they were trained on
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Fig. 1. Diagrammatic sample of whale spectrograms (also called sonagrams) indicating terminology used in describing songs. Fre- 
quency is given on the vertical axis, time on the horizontal axis. The circled areas are spectrograms that have been enlarged to show 
the substructure of sounds which, unless slowed down, are not readily detected by the human ear. 
Harbour. Watlington's hydrophone- 
preamplifier combination was flat in re- 
sponse (?3 decibels) from 500 hertz 
to 10 kilohertz, with an amplitude loss 
of 6 decibels per octave below 500 
hertz. A cable from this hydrophone 
extended to Watlington's office, where 
the sounds were taped by a Magne- 
corder, type PT 6-AH, operating at 
19.1 centimeters per second. Thus, 
when whales uttered sounds within 
range of the hydrophone, Watlington 
was able to make recordings free of 
the usual shipboard and cable noises, 
with the assurance that the whales were 
not being disturbed by the presence of 
an observer. 
Evidence that Sounds Are 
Correctly Ascribed to Humpbacks 
Schevill and Watkins (9), apparent- 
ly referring to some of the same sounds 
from the same Watlington tapes that 
we have described here, have already 
pointed out that the sounds come from 
humpback whales. Additional evidence 
that this is true comes from observa- 
tions by Watlington. By using binoc- 
ulars, he was able, on several occa- 
sions, to observe whales blowing in the 
vicinity of the hydrophones during a 
recording of "whale sounds." On rare 
occasions, Watlington was able to veri- 
fy that these whales were humpbacks 
by noting the prominent white flippers 
when the whales breached. However, 
such observations did not accompany 
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all of the recordings analyzed in detail 
here. 
In addition to the tapes provided by 
Watlington, we have taken into con- 
sideration several hundred hours of 
recordings made by Payne, who has 
studied humpback sounds and behavior 
off Bermuda during the past five 
springs (1967 to 1971). Payne and 
Payne (10) have reviewed many of 
these tapes by noting the form of the 
sounds in a simple shorthand and, in 
some cases, by spectrographic analysis. 
All of our general conclusions about 
songs are based on considerations of 
both the Watlington and Payne record- 
ings, but all spectrographic analyses 
shown here are from the Watlington 
recordings. 
The evidence that Payne's recordings 
come from humpbacks is as follows: 
(i) when the sounds (such as those 
to be analyzed here) that were heard 
were loud and whales were visible in 
the area, the whales proved in each in- 
stance to be humpbacks; (ii) interposi- 
tion of a motorboat's wake between 
identifiable, nearby humpbacks and a 
hydrophone reduced the intensity of the 
sounds being recorded (the bubbles in 
the wake presumably acted as a partial 
screen); (iii) unfavorable orientation 
of a hydrophone array in relation to a 
visible group of humpbacks reduced 
the intensity of the sounds recorded 
(one occasion); (iv) pauses in an ex- 
ceptionally loud series of sounds were 
correlated with blowing of a nearby 
humpback at the surface (several oc- 
casions) and with a breaching hump- 
back (one occasion); and (v) while 
drifting in a boat on a very calm sea, 
Payne went near a pair of clearly 
identifiable humpbacks and heard one 
whale emit a complete sequence of 
sounds, of the sort described here, 
Fig. 2. Here, as well as in Figs. 3 to 5, the right side shows a machine spectrographic 
analysis of two complete songs (labeled 1 and 2). Frequency and time scales are indi- cated. The left side is a tracing of the spectrograms on the right, emphasizing loud 
notes of the song and leaving out noise, echoes, distant whales, and all harmonics (ex- 
cept in the case of pulsive sounds, which depend on their harmonic structure for the effect they have on the human ear). The gap between spectrographs of songs 1 and 2 is designed to make the individual songs clear and is not indicative of any gap in time. 
This figure shows two songs of whale I, recorded 28 April 1964 by F. Watlington of 
the Palisades Sofar Station, St. David's, Bermuda. Note dynamite blasts occurring in 
pairs every 10 minutes. These two songs are part of a series of seven from this whale, and by comparison with earlier songs, lacking the dynamite blasts, we find that the 
blasts do not have any detectable effect on the whale's rendition of its song. We have other examples of whales singing, without change in the form of the song, right 
through loud underwater sounds generated by other research activities in the area. The dashed line at about 500 hertz represents propeller noise from a passing freighter. Echoes are prominent, making louder sounds appear three times on the original spec- 
trograms. 
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Figure 1: Illustration of cases of s manticity, combinatoriality and compositionality in naturally-
occurring communication systems. Sem nticity is widespread in the animal kingdom, for example in
alarm or food calls [see e.g. 3, 4, for review]; here, s manticity is exhibit by part of the alarm call
system of vervet monkeys, who use thr distinct alarm calls (glossed “c ugh”, “chutter” and “bark”)
to refer to three predators (eagles, snakes nd leop rds respectively) [5]. Combinatoriali y is also seen
in animal communication, in cases wh re complex vocalisations are built by combini g elements from
a smaller inventory of recombinable units, for example in b rdso g, the long calls of the gibbon, or
(as illustrated here) the song of humpback whales [6, 7, 8]. Combinatoriality in these song systems
is (as far as we currently know) essentially ornamental and serves no referential function. There is
also some evidence of rudimentary combinatoriality and perhaps compositionality in alarm calls. Putty-
nosed monkeys combine two distinct alarm call types in sequence to provide a third communicative
signal which serves a distinct communicative function (coordinating group movement rather than sig-
nalling the presence of predators, [9]), a semantic and combinatorial system which appears also to be
exploited to increase the available repertoire of distinct signals in other forest monkeys [10] and even in
bacteria [11]. There is also evidence from monkeys and birds that call combinations can have semantic
effects beyond merely providing a distinct vocalisation. Southern pied babblers produce two-call combi-
nations consisting of an alert call and a recruitment call, where the combination serves to recruit group
members to mob predators [12]. A similar use of two-call combinations is seen in Campbell’s monkeys
[13]. While it remains to be seen whether more sophisticated combinatorial and compositional systems
will be discovered in other species, current cases therefore clearly lack the open-ended expressivity of
human language, which is illustrated here with a toy grammar where each syntactic operation (rules
with arrows) is associated with a semantic operation (semantic primitives in italics). This grammar
allows complex signals with predictable meanings to be constructed and interpreted by recursively ap-
plying rules and their associated semantics, producing tree structures as seen on the right where each
intermediate construction has a well-defined semantics. Animal icons from thenounproject.com (eagle
created by Tatiana Belkina, snake by Jennifer Cozzette, leopard by Adriano Emerick, monkey by Bailey
Thompson, bird by Alena Artemova); whale song image from R. S. Payne, S. McVay., Songs of humpback
whales, Science 173 (1971) 585– 597, reprinted with permission from AAAS; semantic formalism for
human grammar inspired by [14].
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Figure 2: Illustration of components of an artificial language learning paradigm. During training, par-
ticipants are familiarised with labels for stimuli (here, images of novel shapes, from [28]). Two methods
can then be used to extract data from participants for subsequent transmission to a new learner. In a
recall test (middle) the participant is simply prompted with stimuli and asked to recall their labels (par-
ticipant’s productions indicated by handwriting font); errors during recall will result in a new version
of the language. In a communicative test, pairs of participants (here labelled A and B) interact commu-
nicatively: participant A generates a label for a given stimulus, as in a recall test, which their partner B
then has to interpret, e.g. by selecting from an array of possible stimuli; the roles then switch, with B
producing a label which is interpreted by A.
to the best of their ability, rather than use it to communicate with another person)
tend to become underspecified and eventually highly degenerate: multiple related
concepts are expressed by a small number of highly ambiguous words [27, 30] (see
Figure 3). Learning is the only pressure at play in these experiments, and simpler
systems are easier to learn; furthermore, the mistakes learners make tend to in-
crease simplicity (e.g. in reusing a word to convey a set of related meanings, or
jettisoning words altogether). The cumulative effect of this simplicity bias in learn-
ing is maximally simple languages.
In contrast, languages which are not passed on to naive individuals, but instead
used repeatedly for communication by the same pair of individuals, become well-
tuned to their communicative needs, but not necessarily compositionally structured
([28]; but see [31] for conditions under which interaction alone can produce struc-
ture). The need to communicate successfully forces signals to remain distinct, and
since the language is never transmitted to new learners there is no countervailing
pressure from learning favouring simplicity.
However, when languages are both learned and used (with the language pro-
duced during communication by one pair forming the input to learning by the next
pair in a chain of transmission; see Figure 3), languages evolve which encode fea-
tures of meaning according to compositional rules. Compositional systems consti-
tute a trade-off between the partially-competing pressures from learning and com-
munication, in that compositional grammars are relatively simple yet expressive:
the regularities they contain can be exploited by learners during acquisition, but
they nonetheless allow meaning to be unambiguously encoded and decoded.
The capacities underpinning the emergence of structure
What cognitive capacities must be in place for linguistic structure to emerge
from iterated learning? A review of the modelling literature plus new modelling
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Figure 3: Population configurations for iterated learning (upper) and illustrative languages (lower; note
that these example languages are smaller than those used in the cited papers). In recall chains (as in e.g.
[27]), the language reproduced by one participant during a recall test becomes the target for learning in
another individual. Under these circumstances, underspecified or degenerate language emerge, where
the overall number of labels reduces and labels become partially or fully ambiguous. In dyads, a single
pair of individuals interact repeatedly; in this condition, holistic languages (which provide a distinct
label for each referent but do not exhibit compositional structure) can be preserved. Finally, in interactive
chains, the language produced during communication by one pair provides the input to learning in a new
pair of individuals; compositional languages emerge in these circumstances (in the example language:
first two syllables encode shape, second two syllables encode colour), which allow the language to be
relatively easily learned by each new generation but (unlike underspecified or degenerate languages)
useful for communication. Stimuli and example languages from [28].
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work [28] indicates that there are two main capacities required: the capacity to
learn compositional mappings from data, and to reason about the pragmatics of
communication.
The capacity to acquire compositional systems
Unsurprisingly, in order for a compositional system to develop through learning
and use, learners have to be able to acquire compositionally-structured systems
from input data (although they do not need to be predisposed to do so — in [28]
learners were orders of magnitude more likely to infer a degenerate language than
a compositional one). The capacity to acquire a compositional language can itself
be broken down into three component capacities.
Firstly, it requires the ability to learn the form of signals from input. This capac-
ity is widespread in the natural world, in vocal learners (e.g. song birds, whales,
[6, 32]), but also in non-vocal modalities (e.g. in apes trained to use artificial com-
municative media, [33]). Animal artificial grammar learning studies also show that
a range of species are sensitive to regularities in the form of input sequences (e.g.
[34, 35]).
Secondly, learning a compositional grammar requires the ability to identify that
signals are motivated by or associated with (sometimes complex) internal or en-
vironmental stimuli. In humans, this involves identifying the communicative in-
tention behind signals [36, 37], one aspect of our sophisticated capacity to reason
about the minds of others [38]. Non-human animals have much more rudimentary
capacities for inferring the mental states of others; until recently there was little
evidence that even our closest relatives understood that other individuals had men-
tal states which diverged from their own, although recent experimental evidence is
overturning this belief [39]. Despite these limitations, various animals have been
trained to associate referents with labels: dogs can learn a large inventory of word-
object pairings [40, 41], and chimpanzees can be trained to associate visual symbols
with objects or colours [42]. It seems unlikely that this involves reasoning about
the signaller’s communicative intention, and simpler processes of associative or re-
inforcement learning might suffice in these cases, although presumably inferring
more complex communicative intentions requires more sophisticated mindreading
abilities.
Finally, learning a compositional language not only involves learning the form of
signals and identifying their meaning, but also acquiring and representing a compo-
sitional mapping relating signals and meanings, i.e. going beyond non-compositional
associations between discrete symbols and atomic concepts to a grammar which
specifies how complex combinations can be built and interpreted (as in the com-
positional grammar in Figure 1). There are cases where non-human animals have
been trained on miniature languages which exhibit compositionality. As reviewed
in Figure 1, there are alarm call systems arguably featuring this kind of composi-
tionality; however, there is no evidence that the rules of call combination or their
semantic effects are themselves learned. Domestic dogs have been trained to re-
spond appropriately to two- and three-word instructions, where doing so requires
comprehension of both the component words and the semantics associated with
their combination, e.g. understanding the difference between the instructions take
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the bone to the ball and take the ball to the bone [43, 44]. Two captive dolphins
were trained to respond correctly to more complex, compositional commands [45];
a human-reared chimpanzee was capable of interpreting complex instructions, and
also of producing complex signals which exhibited some of the same structures
([33], but see [46] for an intriguing analysis of the limits of Kanzi’s linguistic knowl-
edge); similar abilities have been shown in a language-trained parrot [47].
While these case studies show that non-human animals are capable of learning
compositional systems, they shed less light on the process of learning itself: while
the procedures for demonstrating the command of the system are rigorously con-
trolled, the training procedures are far less well documented and controlled (nat-
urally so since training spans many years). Some basic questions therefore remain
about how these systems are learned by non-humans. What kind of input is required
for them to learn compositional grammars? Is mere exposure to complex utterances
enough, or is carefully-staged training required, moving from simple one-element
sequences to more complex combinations? What kind of errors are made at various
stages of learning, and what do those tell us about the biases at play during learn-
ing? Much of the animal AGL literature has focussed on the learning of grammars
for complex sequences (relevant to the first point above), but studies applying the
same rigorous techniques to the acquisition of compositional mappings are virtu-
ally non-existent. One exception is a study of the ability of Guinea baboons to learn
a simple compositional mapping between coloured shapes and visually-presented
two-letter sequences [48], where the colour of the shape was encoded in one letter
of the sequence and the shape in the other. The ability of the animals to interpret
novel, untrained combinations was surprisingly poor, despite many thousands of
training trials; only one of seven baboons showed evidence of generalization, and
even then performance seemed rather fragile; furthermore, training on individual
letter-colour or letter-shape correspondences prior to training on two-element com-
binations seemed to hinder acquisition of the compositional mapping, rather than
facilitate it. More work is clearly required to build a more comprehensive picture of
the conditions under which compositional mappings can be acquired by non-human
animals, and whether they bring the same biases to these tasks as humans.
The capacity for pragmatic reasoning
Once a compositional system has been acquired, it has to be deployed for com-
munication. In our modelling work [28] we assumed that during interaction indi-
viduals have a tendency to avoid utterances which were potentially ambiguous; this
alone was sufficient to penalise degenerate languages and push the languages to-
wards expressive types. A speaker who models their audience will identify the prob-
lems posed by ambiguous utterances and therefore avoid such utterances [49, 37];
humans indeed seem to be capable of substantially more sophisticated inferences
about their interlocutor than this [50]. Much less is known about the capacities
of non-humans to make similar pragmatic inferences [38, 51], although recent
painstaking observational studies of chimpanzee alarm calling in the wild provide
suggestive evidence that their use of warning calls is modulated by the audience’s
awareness of dangers [52], which would indicate some (rudimentary) capacity to
reason about the mental states of others during communication.
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Human uniqueness in the capacities underpinning the emergence of structure
Perhaps surprisingly, at least the rudiments of all of the capacities required to
support the cultural evolution of compositional, language-like systems are present
in non-humans, including in other great apes, suggesting that the discontinuities
between humans and other animals in the capacities underpinning language may
be rather minimal. Four observations seem worth making. Firstly, the ability to
reason about the mental states of others plays a dual role in the evolution of struc-
ture: reasoning about the minds of others allows a learner to infer the intended
meaning behind an utterance, and then dictates how the inferred language is de-
ployed during communication. Understanding the evolution of the human capacity
for theory of mind therefore seems likely to be highly informative to understanding
the evolution of language, and language and theory of mind might indeed have co-
evolved [53]. Second, the ability to produce complex signals seems unlikely to be
the limiting factor, since non-vocal modalities have the same combinatorial poten-
tial. Third, the conditions under which non-human animals can acquire composi-
tional mappings seems like a major gap in our current knowledge, and a potentially
informative line for future animal AGL work. Fourth, and finally, one prediction of
the cultural evolutionary approach is that if the ‘missing’ capacities could be scaf-
folded in some other species, then we would expect the same types of structure to
evolve, a prediction which can be tested experimentally [54].
Conclusions
Understanding the conditions under which structured linguistic systems emerge
from iterated learning, the repeated cycle of learning and use, provides useful in-
sights into the cognitive capacities required for language. Our approach has been to
model (in simulation or in the lab) the way in which linguistic systems evolve. This
approach suggests two lines for future research on non-human cognition, in partic-
ular, work which will uncover the cognitive capacities, evolutionary trajectories and
selection pressures leading to the capacity to learn compositional grammars and to
make inferences during communication about how they should be used.
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Annotations for bibliography
For reference [28] (one star)
Computational and experimental models of iterated learning, instantiating the
various contrasts between population types shown in in Figure 3. Demonstrates
that linguistic structure emerges when pressures inherent in learning and use are
both at play, but either in isolation is insufficient.
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For reference [39] (two stars)
In the main paper I argue that capacity to represent and reason about the mental
states of others is a key prerequisite for the evolution of linguistic structure. This
paper shows for the first time the ability to reason about false belief in great apes,
and therefore represents a major step in our understanding of social cognition in
non-humans. To demonstrate false belief understanding, they adapted anticipatory
looking paradigms from infant research, and showed that great apes anticipated
the actions of another individual based on that individual’s (false) beliefs about the
world.
For reference [48] (one star)
In the main paper I argue that the capacity of non-human animals to acquire
compositional mappings from input is an important yet understudied topic. This
paper presents two experiments exploring systematically the ability of baboons to
acquire a simple compositional mapping between coloured shapes and visually-
presented two-letter sequences. The ability of the animals to interpret novel, un-
trained combinations was surprisingly poor.
For reference [37] (two stars)
This is a review of the Rational Speech Act Model, a formalisation of Grice’s work
on the pragmatics of communication. The Rational Speech Act model provides a
formalisation of the inference of meaning in context, and provides an indispens-
able set of tools for researchers who want to model the process by which linguistic
systems are built through interaction and adapt to their context of use.
For reference [52] (one star)
In the main paper I argue that capacity to represent and reason about the mental
states of others is a key prerequisite for the evolution of linguistic structure. This
paper provides suggestive (but not iron-clad) evidence from wild chimpanzees that
chimpanzees are capable of reasoning about knowledge and ignorance in their au-
dience, as evidenced by the effects of audience knowledge on their alarm calling
behaviour.
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